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Abstract
In this paper I argue that pluralism at the level of logical systems requires a certain 
monism at the meta-logical level, and so, in a sense, there cannot be pluralism all 
the way down. The adequate alternative logical systems bottom out in a shared basic 
meta-logic, and as such, logical pluralism is limited. I argue that the content of this 
basic meta-logic must include the analogue of logical rules Modus Ponens (MP) and 
Universal Instantiation (UI). I show this through a detailed analysis of the ‘adoption 
problem’, which manifests something special about MP and UI. It appears that MP 
and UI underwrite the very nature of a logical rule of inference, due to all rules of 
inference being conditional and universal in their structure. As such, all logical rules 
presuppose MP and UI, making MP and UI self-governing, basic, unadoptable, and 
(most relevantly to logical pluralism) required in the meta-logic for the adequacy of 
any logical system.
Keywords Adoption problem · Logical pluralism · Logical rules · Inference
1 Introduction
According to a metaphysical reading of logical pluralism, there is a plurality of cor-
rect logics (as opposed to only one, as the logical monist says). A more epistemic 
reading of logical pluralism, however, can be dated back to Carnap:
… in logic there are no morals. Everyone is at liberty to build up his own 
logic, i.e., his own form of language, as he wishes.1
This is otherwise known as Carnap’s Principle of Tolerance:
… let any postulates and rules of inference be chosen arbitrarily; then this 
choice, whatever it may be, will determine what meaning is to be assigned to 
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1 Carnap (1937), pp. 51–52.
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the fundamental logical symbols… The standpoint we have suggested —we 
will call it the Principle of Tolerance… — relates not only to mathematics, but 
to all questions of logic.2
In order for this Principle to make sense, there must be a plurality of logics for 
us to be tolerant towards that are equally worthy of being chosen. A metaphysical 
reading of logical pluralism thus seems to be entailed by the epistemic Principle of 
Tolerance, and requires that there be alternative logics to be pluralistic about.
I will speak of logical systems to describe formal systems with rules of infer-
ence, and take logical pluralism to be a thesis about these logical systems. So what 
qualifies something as a logical system such that there could be many different (but 
relatively similar in order to class as) instances of them that are equally true? This is 
related to the opening of Beall and Restall’s paper ‘Logical Pluralism’:
Anyone acquainted with contemporary Logic knows that there are many so-
called logics. But are these logics rightly so-called? Are any of the menagerie 
of non-classical logics, such as relevant logics, intuitionistic logic, paraconsist-
ent logics or quantum logics, as deserving of the title ‘logic’ as classical logic? 
On the other hand, is classical logic really as deserving of the title ‘logic’ as 
relevant logic (or any of the other non-classical logics)?3
Rather than answering whether these logics are ‘rightly so-called’, I tackle a more 
epistemological question as to whether they are equally worthy of being chosen. I 
answer that they are not, due to the metaphysical reason that some logics are not 
as adequate as others, where inadequacy is due to deviance from what I argue is a 
core, basic, meta-logic.4 Without certain meta-logical content, the logic is useless 
and thus not as equally worthy of being chosen.5 I show that pluralism at the level 
of logical systems requires a certain monism at the level of meta-logic, and so, in 
a sense, there cannot be pluralism all the way down. This is not just the claim that 
there must be some unifying feature to all of the logics that qualifies them as being 
pluralistic tokens of a monistic type. Of course, to be pluralist about x, the different 
x1…xn need to be a kind of x, giving an uninteresting case of how pluralism bottoms 
out in monism regarding what the pluralist is a pluralist about. So, I am not simply 
stating that pluralism about logical systems bottoms out in monism about logic just 
due to the logical systems having a shared subject matter of logic. Instead, I argue 
that adequate logical systems bottom out in shared meta-logical content, and as such 
logical pluralism is limited. The pluralism is limited at the level of logic due to the 
2 Carnap (1937), p. xv.
3 Beall and Restall (2000), p. 475. ‘Logic’ (capital L) for the discipline; ‘logic’ for a system.
4 I do not use the term ‘adequacy’ for the conjunction of the soundness and completeness of a system 
(yet perhaps the limits I highlight pertain to meta-logical adequacy in this sense).
5 One might argue that I am making an epistemological argument against a metaphysical thesis of 
logical pluralism. I thank a reviewer for this. But in so far as, say, Carroll’s (1895) problem reveals an 
important constraint on logic despite its epistemological flavour, so can my argument here be taken to 
reveal an important limitation on logical pluralism, be it epistemic or not. My result can also be seen 
as meta-meta-logical, given that the adequacy of a logical system depends on certain constraints on the 
meta-logic behind it.
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requirements at the level of meta-logic, and the plurality of adequate alternative log-
ical systems is limited to those that share a certain meta-logic.
I use the term ‘meta-logic’ to pick out a meta-level M of rules that underwrite 
the rules of inference at the level of a logical system L. Standardly (yet disputed), 
M is taken to contain analogues of all the rules of L, such that the meta-language 
of M has the same logic as the object-language of L.6 But I argue that for every 
adequate L, M must include analogues of the following basic logical rules of infer-
ence: Modus Ponens (hereon MP); and Universal Instantiation (hereon UI). I argue 
that there is something special about MP and UI that give them this privileged status 
at the meta-level. I will demonstrate what I take this special feature to be through an 
examination of their vulnerability to Kripke and Padró’s ‘adoption problem’, which 
argues (against Carnapian logical pluralism) that adopting any logic is impossible:
… the Carnapian tradition about logic maintained that one can adopt any kind 
of laws for the logical connectives that one pleases. This is a principle of toler-
ance… Now, here we already have the notion of adopting a logic… As I said 
[last time], I don’t think you can adopt a logic.7
Somewhere between the Carnapian and Kripkean extremes, I argue that there can 
only be alternative logical systems up to a point, but we cannot do (or have) logic 
without UI and MP—this is the limit to logical pluralism. For the same reason that 
UI and MP are unadoptable, they are also basic and required at the meta-level M.
2  The adoption problem
In order to see what I see is special about MP and UI, we must take a (de)tour via 
Kripke and Padró’s adoption problem (hereon AP), which can be outlined as such:
Certain basic logical principles cannot be adopted, because, if a subject 
already infers in accordance with them, no adoption is needed, and if the sub-
ject does not infer in accordance with them, no adoption is possible.8
Utilizing the AP, I show that there are only some logical rules that cannot be 
adopted, in that they cannot be rationally accepted and utilized to guide inferences. 
I argue that these rules are the most basic of our logical rules, and the reason why 
they cannot be adopted is due to them being what I diagnose as ‘self-governing’. I 
describe a rule as being self-governing when it is of the very structure that it itself 
governs, which results in it presupposing and applying to itself. The only rules that 
6 See Dummett (1991) and Williamson (2017) for opposing views on the sensitivity of L to M. My 
stance is not that M need match L, but that UI and MP are needed in M for all L.
7 Kripke [Princeton Seminar, quote found in Padró (2015), p. 113].
8 Padró (2015), p. 42. Padró speaks of logical principles here but she and Kripke argue that the adoption 
problem holds also for logical rules of inference. I will only speak of logical rules, but I take what I say 
in this paper to apply straightforwardly to logical principles. I also do not enter into the debate regarding 
the distinction between rules of inference and rules that state what follows from what—for a discussion 
of this, see Harman (1986).
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I consider as self-governing in this way are UI and MP. On my analysis, the rea-
son why such rules cannot be adopted is the same reason why I take those rules to 
be basic and required at the meta-level for any adequate alternative logical system: 
namely, because they govern all logical rules of inference, including themselves.
To demonstrate the self-governance of UI and MP and the relevance of this to 
logical pluralism, I will first need to dissect the AP as follows. In Sect. 2.1, I will 
describe the type of subject who would be directly affected by the AP—namely 
those who lack the relevant practice of inferring in a certain way. In Sect. 2.2, I will 
clarify the notion of adoption and what exactly in the process of adoption causes dif-
ficulties for such a subject—namely when it comes to inferring in accordance with 
the rule in virtue of accepting that rule. In Sect. 2.3, most of the exegesis stops and 
my analysis begins, as I will discuss which logical rules I take to be affected and 
what it is about them that makes them unadoptable—namely the most basic rules of 
inference, UI and MP. Then, in Sect. 3, I will show that such basic rules encounter 
a kind of self-governance by being of the very structure that the rule itself aims to 
govern, and it is this feature that I argue prevents them from being adoptable. As 
such, I use the AP to manifest the self-governing nature of the basic logical rules of 
inference. I dissect the problem with adoption by clarifying the problematic adop-
ter (the type of subject), adoption (the part of the process), and adopted (the rules 
affected), and I use this to provide my own account for what it is that makes a logical 
rule basic: by being self-governing. Finally, in Sect. 4, I argue that these basic rules 
provide the necessary meta-logic for all adequate logics, as all logical rules (includ-
ing UI and MP) will presuppose them.
2.1  The adopter
The AP is best described with an example. So let me introduce Padró’s case of Harry 
and Kripke’s situation of John the raven.9 Harry is what I describe as a ‘novice’, 
where to be a novice is to have no experience of a certain thing, in this case with 
the rule of inference called Universal Instantiation (UI). UI tells us that from any 
universal statement each particular instance follows. Harry is a UI novice because 
he has never heard of, nor inferred in accordance with, the UI rule, and so he has no 
familiarity with either the rule or the practice. The AP arises when we invite such a 
novice to pick up the practice of inferring according to a specific rule of inference, 
by means of accepting that rule itself. So suppose we want Harry to adopt the UI 
rule, so that he can use it to infer the colour of John, a particular raven that he cannot 
see, from the universal statement that the colour of all ravens are black. Kripke and 
Padró claim that telling Harry the UI rule would not help him make the inference 
about John’s colour.10 Harry would already need to be able to make UI inferences 
to grasp that the UI rule applies to the case of ravens, namely to the universal state-
ment about their colour. Yet Harry cannot apply it to this case of ravens, since to do 
9 See Padró (2015). Harry is, of course, fictional, as is John the raven.
10 Kripke and Padró state that someone who sometimes but not always infers according to UI may be 
helped by stating the rule for them. This shows the significance of novice status.
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so presupposes a move from a general rule to a particular case—a move that Harry 
has never performed. In a sense, Harry’s ‘novice’ status paralyses him, since without 
the corresponding inferential practice in place (or as I take it, UI in the meta-logic), 
Harry cannot know how or when to apply the rule.
Given this set up, a worry is whether such novices who cannot adopt certain rules 
are even possible: it may be the case that we are not like Harry, and also it may be 
that there never has been and never will be anyone quite like Harry. Without any 
such novice subjects though, there would be nobody for the AP to directly apply to. 
But such an objection seems to miss the point. Harry’s novice status highlights that 
the inferential practice is prior to the acceptance of the inference rule, and this tells 
us something general that applies to us all. Regardless of their reality, considering 
novices like Harry provides us with counterexamples to accounts of rule-following 
and the nature of inference (specifically, accounts that require a prior acceptance of 
the rule and that give such rules a guiding role). Therefore the worry is not whether 
we could be in Harry’s position or whether such novices exist, but what hypothesiz-
ing about such novices will tell us about the possibility of rule-following and the 
nature of inference, and of greater interest here, the limits of logical pluralism. I 
will argue that the difficulty Harry faces due to being a novice shows us something 
significant about the inference rules that he tries and fails to adopt. Harry’s novice 
status serves to bring out a feature of those rules that I will call ‘self-governing’, 
which on my analysis is what prevents them from being used on the basis of rational 
acceptance only. Next I will clarify what I take to be the most important element of 
adoption to understand what in the process is so problematic.
2.2  The adoption
Padró characterizes the notion of adoption as such:
Adoption of a logical rule = acceptance of the rule + practice of inferring in 
accordance with that rule in virtue of the acceptance of that rule.11
So, to adopt a rule is to come to infer in accordance with it because one accepts 
it. Under this characterization, there cannot be any use-less adoption. The practice 
of inferring is a necessary part of the adoption process; it is built into the notion 
of adoption by definition. If you accept a rule but fail to infer in accordance with it 
as a result, then you fail to adopt the rule. Thus ‘acceptance’ is not ‘adoption’. So 
adoption is useful or impossible, (where to be useful is to generate the practice), and 
11 Padró (2015), p. 32. To make sense, adoption, acceptance, and practice, must be distinct.
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Padró and Kripke aim to show that it cannot be useful and so it’s impossible.12 With 
adoption defined, we can identify three elements of the adoption process:
(A) The acceptance of an inference rule R
(B) The practice of inferring in accordance with that rule R
(C) Doing B in virtue of A
In order to successfully adopt, ‘A’, ‘B’, and ‘C’ need to occur, as their combina-
tion is simply what adoption is by definition. Kripke and Padró argue that Harry fails 
to adopt, and so Harry must be failing to do at least ‘A’, ‘B’, or ‘C’, but which is it?
Let’s start with ‘A’. Padró equates acceptance with belief: “acceptance of the rule 
[is] understood as an explicit or implicit belief that the rule is correct.”13 I, however, 
take acceptance to be identified with only explicit belief since implicit belief may 
be taken as a disposition to act in a certain way that blurs the distinction between 
‘A’ and ‘B’ (and we should keep them distinct). It is built into the example of Harry 
that he does explicitly believe and accept UI, as Kripke describes the case: “I say to 
[Harry], ‘consider the hypothesis that from each universal statement, each instance 
follows’, and he believes me.”14 At this point then it cannot be failure of acceptance 
of a rule that makes adoption impossible, as the AP is set up on the assumption that 
belief, and thus acceptance, occurs in Harry’s case.
So, moving on to ‘B’. Whether the practice of inferring in accordance with a 
rule is problematic depends on how we interpret the ‘in accordance with’ notion: as 
either conformity or rule-following.15 Harry may accidently conform to UI by utter-
ing ‘All ravens are black, therefore John the raven is black’, as a sequence of words 
or thoughts can happen to conform to a rule. If such conformity were all that is 
required for inferring in accordance with a rule, then Harry would be said to infer in 
that scenario. Inferring would be simply the movement from one thought to another, 
as it is easy enough to conjure up a rule that it conforms to.16 But an issue that the 
12 It should be emphasized that Padró’s ‘adoption’ is a technical term, where others may use the word 
differently in a less technical way in the literature. Indeed, Kripke complains that noone in the literature 
explains what they mean by ‘adoption’, yet it is used as if there were a standard procedure that adoption 
consisted in. One should be careful when engaging in this AP to ensure that they are talking of the same 
kind of ‘adoption’. Even Kripke has used the word in a way that is incompatible with Padró’s definition: 
“if we did adopt [a rule], it would have done us absolutely no good.” (Quote found in Padró (2015), p. 
112). To do ‘no good’ is to be useless, and so Kripke must mean that the acceptance does ‘no good’. 
Kripke does not define what he takes adoption to be, since he complains that he simply does not under-
stand what it could mean. (See Padró (2015), fn. 42, p. 31). Yet Padró’s characterization is meant to cap-
ture the way Kripke uses the word, so I work only with Padró’s definition.
13 Padró (2015), p. 190. Adoption is considered only from the first person perspective.
14 Quote found in Padró (2015), p. 35. Padró (2015), p. 62 says acceptance may be problematic: “It 
could be argued that neither Harry nor [the Tortoise] have either accepted or understood the rules we 
gave them.” This was first raised in connection with Carroll by Black (1970), p. 21: “The form of words 
‘understanding and accepting premises of the form p and if p then q, but not accepting the corresponding 
position of the form q’ describes nothing at all.” Padró thinks Black is correct but misses the point: in 
this situation, the AP repeats itself, as the reason why Harry could not accept is the same reason why he 
could not adopt. I argue this demonstrates something special about the logical rules UI and MP.
15 The distinction is widely debated in the literature. See Miller and Wright (2002).
16 Boghossian (2008), p. 9 notes there are infinitely many rules that our behaviour accords to.
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AP forces upon us is whether inferring is conforming, or, on the other hand, if it is 
a case of rule-following. If inferring is a rule-governed practice, then the distinction 
between ‘B’ and ‘C’ is blurred (which we should keep sharp), as the practice occur-
ring in ‘B’ is already in virtue of the rule at hand. The ‘in accordance with’ in ‘B’ 
needs to be interpreted in a non-rule-guided way, as otherwise ‘in accordance with’ 
in ‘B’ seems to do the same work as ‘in virtue of’ in ‘C’ (as it is natural, though con-
testable, that rule-following consists of ‘B’ in virtue of ‘A’). Such a conflation would 
prevent us from locating the specific problem in adoption.
Part ‘C’ of the process ensures that ‘A’ is prior to ‘B’, since ‘C’ demands that the 
practice in ‘B’ is developed in virtue of the acceptance in ‘A’, where the acceptance 
comes before the practice. It is this requirement from ‘C’ that makes the practice of 
inferring a rule-governed process, which begins in and is explained by acceptance 
of a rule of inference. ‘C’ is a relation between ‘A’ and ‘B’, namely, doing ‘B’ in 
virtue of ‘A’. I call this ‘in virtue of’ relation the ‘utility’ of a rule, as it intends to 
give the rule a use.17 Without ‘C’ supplementing ‘B’ (or being built into ‘B’ via a 
loaded understanding of what it means to infer in accordance with a rule), we accord 
to a rule by mere conformance, and the rule plays no guiding role. What ‘C’ adds is 
the rule being the reason for the conformance, so that the rule is followed. Whether 
we can understand rule-following without ‘C’, and inferring without rule-following, 
is what the AP invites us to explore.18 If it is ‘C’ that transforms the inferring in 
‘B’ from accidental conforming to guided rule-following, then the AP challenges 
the possibility of rule-following, and if the inferring in ‘B’ cannot be understood as 
rule-following, then the AP challenges the nature of inferring. This specifies Padró’s 
target of the AP as accounts of rule-following and inference where rules have utility.
But why is it that rules cannot play a guiding role? This is where Kripke and 
Padró’s analysis ends, and mine really takes off. My explanation for the lack of util-
ity in the rules is due to the nature of the rules in question. On my analysis, there is 
something special about such rules that make them unadoptable, as there is a feature 
of them that requires one not to be a novice precisely in order to be able to adopt 
them. This special feature is the topic of the next sections and provides the reason 
why such rules are needed at the meta-level of all adequate logical systems.
2.3  The adopted
Kripke argues that in general, logic cannot be adopted. Yet, in Padró’s articulation 
of the AP she restricts the unadoptable rules to only some basic ones, as such:
17 This ‘in virtue of’ relation (utility of a rule in ‘C’) is similar to what Kripke (1982) calls ‘internaliz-
ing’ a rule, and is captured by Boghossian’s ‘Taking Condition’ (2014, p. 4) which specifies the relation 
between a conclusion and the premises we take it to follow from, and it distinguishes inferences from 
mere sequences of thoughts. What all these notions refer to is the act of inferring being done because of 
the rule. But this is not a causal connection, as Padró (2015), p. 42 describes. Rather it treats the rule as 
being the reason for the inference due to the rule guiding the inference, and can be said to ground it in 
some way.
18 For debates of this sort see the exchange between Boghossian (2014) and Wright (2014).
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The adoption problem is only supposed to affect some basic logical principles 
or rules, like Universal Instantiation or Modus Ponens… Kripke mentions two 
other principles as being affected… adjunction and non-contradiction (the list, 
however, wasn’t intended to be exhaustive).19
The rules that I, like Padró,20 will focus on are MP and UI. Padró thinks that 
the AP “would be interesting even if it only worked with MP and UI”,21 and so 
she clearly allows the AP to have limited scope. Padró does not say much about the 
similarity between MP and UI, yet claims that “there is something special about 
these [unadoptable] principles: they have a self-supporting character that appears 
to run deep.”22 Kripke also claims that there is something unique about these rules, 
but Kripke and Padró are “a bit more cautious and reserve judgment on the matter of 
uniqueness”.23 I (with less caution) attempt to fill in these gaps in the analysis, and 
provide a fuller account of what it is that qualifies rules as being basic that prevents 
them from being adopted and requires them in the meta-logic of adequate systems.
Others describe what makes a rule basic is them being ‘underived’, ‘fundamen-
tal’, ‘primitive’, ‘unjustified’ (as we will discuss in more detail later in Sect. 3.4) or 
even ‘blind’ when it comes to the following of such rules.24 Boghossian also exer-
cises caution when it comes to answering the question as to what makes rules basic 
or the following of them blind (without intentional or explicit acceptance):
You want to know which inference patterns are permitted to be blind? These 
ones: Modus Ponens, Non-Contradiction, and a few others. Don’t ask why it is 
precisely these inference patterns that are sanctioned. There is no deep answer 
to that question; there is just the list.25
I disagree that there is just a list, as I argue there is something the entries on the 
list have in common, which provides a ‘deep answer’ to the question of what counts 
as being a basic logical rule of inference: namely, they are self-supporting due to 
exhibiting what I call self-governance.26 These rules govern such basic and funda-
mental patterns of inference that they underwrite the application of any logical rule, 
including themselves. As such, they govern their own application. It is in virtue of 
these basic rules being self-governing that they cannot be utilized or adopted, and 
thus I diagnose the AP as being due to self-governance. I will give my own analysis 
19 Padró (2015), fn. 52, p. 37. Padró says these are directly affected (private correspondance).
20 Padró (2015), fn. 52, p. 37: “I will only talk about UI and MP. The former is Kripke’s preferred exam-
ple and the latter is Carroll’s own example (and also the case that is most widely discussed in the litera-
ture), but of course it would be interesting to see which other principles are directly affected by this argu-
ment. That task, however, falls outside the scope of what I set out to do.” I somewhat take on that task so 
as to show the limits of pluralism.
21 Padró (2015), fn. 52, p. 37.
22 Padró (2015), p. 14.
23 Padró (2015), fn. 63, p. 49. Emphasis in original.
24 See, for example, Boghossian (2000).
25 Boghossian and Williamson (2003), p. 239.
26 I thank Conor McHugh (private correspondence) for suggesting this terminology to me.
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by looking at the general structure of all logical rules of inference, to demonstrate 
how such structure presupposes (and thus requires) both MP and UI.
3  Self‑governance
3.1  General structure of rules
Logical rules of inference are, very generally speaking, universal and conditional in 
their structure. To be of a universal structure is to apply in all cases of a certain kind. 
To be conditional in structure is to say what to do if one is in a case of a certain kind. 
Logical rules of inference take us from premises to a conclusion via a conditional, 
and are universal meaning that they apply in all cases when the antecedent of that 
conditional is satisfied.27 The antecedent of the conditional will name a situation 
when the rule is applicable, and the consequent of the conditional will name what 
one should do when faced with an instance of that situation. It is therefore written in 
to the very nature of what it is to be a logical rule of inference that it is universal and 
conditional in its structure. I thus take the general structure (GS) of logical rules of 
inference to be universal and conditional, so that all logical rules are of the structure 
GS, which I formulate (somewhat crudely) as follows:
(GS) If the premises are an instance of structure X then infer conclusion Y.
Roughly, GS describes how logical rules of inference are universal (by applying 
in all cases of structure X) and conditional (by moving from X to conclusion Y).
The truth of GS is not easy to prove, however it does find support in the literature. 
For example, Boghossian similarly notes that logical rules have “general content” 
and “conditional content” by telling us “to always perform some action, if I am in 
a particular kind of circumstance.”28 This can easily be rewritten as equivalent to 
GS, where the ‘particular kind of circumstance’ is ‘structure X’ and ‘some action’ 
is ‘conclusion Y’. Furthermore, Boghossian states that inferring is “both general 
and productive”29 where the ‘general’ here indicates what I call being ‘universal’ 
and the ‘productive’ indicates what I call being ‘conditional’. Boghossian also notes 
Kripke’s preferred construal of rules as being general imperatives of this form:
‘If C, do A!’ where ‘C’ names a type of situation and ‘A’ a type of action. On 
this construal, rules are general contents that prescribe certain types of behav-
ior under certain kinds of condition.30
This again has similarities to GS, where ‘C’ names a type of situation by describ-
ing its structure X, and ‘A’ is the action of inferring conclusion Y. Once more, we 
28 Boghossian (2008), p. 21.
29 Boghossian (2014), p. 12.
30 Boghossian (2008), p. 475. It is, however, beyond the scope of this paper to argue whether rules 
should be of imperative form or put in normative, permissive, or propositional terms.
27 This will not cover inferences where there are no premises and only a conclusion.
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see what I call the universal and conditional structures being alluded to in ‘If C, do 
A!’.
GS is also similar to Wright’s ‘Modus Ponens Model’ of rule-following where we 
are presented with a conditional rule, a premise about the situation we are in satisfy-
ing the antecedent of the rule, and then a conclusion about what we infer when we 
apply the rule to that situation, giving us the consequent of the rule:
The rule is stated in the form of a general conditional. A minor premise states 
that, in the circumstances in question, the condition articulated in the anteced-
ent of the rule is met. The conclusion derives the mandate, prohibition, or per-
mission concerned.31
To reframe this according to GS, we need only see the ‘minor premise’ as ‘struc-
ture X’, and ‘the conclusion’ as ‘conclusion Y’, such that the rule’s ‘form of a gen-
eral conditional’ is articulated by GS. Despite the similarities, Wright’s ‘Modus 
Ponens Model’ and my GS are different since GS applies to the rule that is embed-
ded into the first step of Wright’s model, and articulates that rule as being broken up 
into the antecedent (‘structure X’) and the consequent (‘conclusion Y’). I take GS 
to be the general structure of the logical rules themselves, whereas Wright’s model 
is the general structure of rule-following. And as I aim to show, simply accepting 
the rule is not enough to follow it, as one must also know how and where the rule 
applies, by seeing that the antecedent is satisfied and by having the practice already 
in place to apply the rule to that case.
3.2  Modus Ponens and Universal Instantiation
MP tells us: when faced with a conditional and its antecedent (structure X), infer 
the consequent (conclusion Y). UI tells us: when faced with a universal (structure 
X), infer an instance (conclusion Y). MP is a rule that governs conditionals; UI is a 
rule that governs universals. But MP and UI are conditionals and universals them-
selves, in virtue of all logical rules being of conditional and universal structure, as 
GS shows.32 So given that all logical rules of inference are of the form GS, which 
is itself a universal and conditional, then those rules that govern or describe how 
to deal with universal or conditional structures will face problems by being of the 
structure that they themselves govern. Thus UI and MP will unavoidably govern 
themselves, due to always being logical rules which have the structure given by GS, 
which is the same as the structure X that they themselves govern. On my analy-
sis, it is self-governance that prevents a logical rule from being adoptable, and (as I 
31 Wright (2007), p. 490.
32 I take GS to be a conditional of the sort that MP governs. MP usually applies to material conditionals, 
or those rendered false by the conjunction of the antecedent and negation of the consequent. GS is not 
explicitly written in these terms, but since it tells us if in structure X then infer conclusion Y, we can see 
that it is a conditional in the required way. So, if MP both governs and is structured as a material condi-
tional, then MP is unadoptable. All thats required is a match between what is presupposed at GS and the 
rule that governs it.
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will argue) explains its necessary inclusion as a basic logical rule of inference at the 
meta-level of any adequate logical system.
We find further support for my claims when we look at the related cases of Harry 
and Lewis Carroll’s Tortoise33 who battle with UI and MP respectively. I claim that 
both their problems arise due to those rules being self-governing. As for Harry, he 
cannot infer the colour of the particular raven by being told the colour of all ravens 
and the UI rule, since he cannot apply UI to the case of ravens. Harry cannot infer 
that the universal statement about all ravens is one that the UI rule applies to, as that 
presupposes that he can infer from the universal rule of UI to the particular universal 
about ravens. This is due to UI itself being of universal form, and as such being of 
the structure X that it governs. Since Harry does not know what to do in a case of 
structure X, giving him a rule that governs structure X that is itself in the form of 
structure X is not going to help him. He does not infer instances from universals, 
and so will not infer from the applicability of the universal rule UI to the instance of 
the particular universal case of the ravens. He needs to apply UI to the case in order 
to then apply it in the case, and as such needs to apply it twice to infer the colour 
of that raven. This is why UI is required in the meta-logic and the practice needs 
to be prior to acceptance, as otherwise UI is impossible to utilize. As for Carroll’s 
Tortoise, she refuses to accept that the sides of the triangle are ‘equal to each other’ 
when they are ‘equal to the same’, having been told that if the sides are equal to the 
same then they are equal to each other, and being told the MP rule which she chal-
lenges. I claim that this is due to MP being of conditional form—the very form that 
the Tortoise refuses to infer in accordance with. Since she does not respond to struc-
ture X, giving her a rule that dictates how to respond to X that is itself in the form of 
X is not going to move her to infer. These self-governing rules are, as Kripke says, 
“completely useless”34 for getting someone to infer, due to such rules presuppos-
ing themselves which makes them unadoptable. If UI and MP are not present at the 
meta-level then, no rule of inference in any logical system can be adopted, which 
leads to a significant limitation to logical pluralism.
One might object that UI and MP do not have to be stated as generalizations or 
conditionals. But I take it that the specific formulation of UI and MP makes no dif-
ference to their self-governance and thus their status as being unadoptable. Padró 
likewise argues “variations as to how to construe these rules won’t affect the argu-
ment.”35 So the AP holds for such logical rules regardless of how they are stated. 
It does not matter how exactly UI and MP are formulated, as they will still be logi-
cal rules of inference and as such will still have the general form of such rules as 
shown by GS which utilize both a universal and conditional structure. UI need not 
be explicitly formulated using a universal, as the problem is that the rule (like all 
33 Carroll (1895). Harry and Tortoise are different, but they show UI and MP to be similar.
34 “The law of universal instantiation is completely useless… There are certain rules which you just 
couldn’t adopt: you couldn’t tell them to yourself, because if you told them to yourself without already 
using them, they would be useless; so they either don’t help you or they were superfluous anyway. UI has 
this character.” Quotes found in Padró (2015), p. 112.
35 Padró (2015), fn. 70, p. 58.
 Synthese
1 3
logical rules) is general. Thus UI will apply to all cases of universals, making it 
self-governing, even when it is not referred to explicitly. Likewise, MP need not be 
explicitly formulated using a conditional, as the problem arises that the rule (like 
all logical rules) is conditional. MP, like all other logical rules, features a conclu-
sion that is detached and in need of being arrived at through an inference which 
will itself be of a conditional structure. Therefore, UI and MP will always be of the 
structure X that they themselves govern due to GS. Regardless of how UI and MP 
are specifically formulated, it is just due to the fact that they are rules that have the 
general structure of being universal and conditional (like all rules do), that they self-
govern by governing how to deal with universal or conditional contents.
We also cannot prevent UI and MP from being self-governing by taking a syn-
tactic statement of the rules using logically equivalent components36 to avoid mak-
ing use of ∀ or →. They then won’t explicitly refer to the logical component they 
govern, but still cannot help but be of the structure that they govern, and so will be 
self-governing and unadoptable. For example, we may state MP as: from P&(P → Q) 
infer Q.37 If we rewrite this so that it does not make use of the conditional P → Q 
and formulate it with a logically equivalent ~ (P&~Q), we get: from P&(~(P&~Q)), 
infer Q. Yet this would still be unadoptable since its application still involves the use 
of an MP inference.38 A subject still needs to understand that the antecedent situa-
tion P&(~(P&~Q)) holds and that when it holds they should infer Q. Rewriting MP 
without the conditional does not make it adoptable.
Likewise with UI, which we may understand as: from ∀xFx, infer Fa. This may be 
rewritten without explicit reference to the universal ∀x and instead using a logically 
equivalent ~ (∃x) ~ to create this rule: from ~ (∃x) ~ Fx, infer Fa. This would still be 
unadoptable, just like in its original formulation, due to being self-governing as its 
application involves the use of an UI inference pattern. A subject would still need to 
somehow understand that a particular instance of the antecedent situation ~ (∃x) ~ Fx 
holds and that whenever there is such an instance they should infer Fa.39 This is 
because, regardless of the rule in question, one needs a grasp of how to deal with 
universals and conditionals due to GS showing us that all rules are of universal and 
conditional structure. So, however we formulate UI and MP, they always presuppose 
an understanding of, or inference in accordance with, UI and MP, due to GS. UI 
and MP will always be unadoptable because of this, and will always be basic rules 
required at the meta-level in order to understand rules at the level of logical systems. 
36 Interdefinability only holds on classical frameworks and so cannot be my method to show formulation 
doesn’t matter. But it is not–my method uses GS to show the form rules have.
37 We learn from Carroll (1895) to resist writing rules of inference for a theory as single sentences of 
that theory, so we ascend to the meta-language and write: ‘From P and (P → Q), infer Q’. My point is 
replacing P → Q with ~ (P&~Q) wont help as it only prevents MP from using a conditional in part of the 
rule but the whole rule will still be a conditional.
38 Padró (2015), fn. 56: “We could express [MP] as ((¬p∨q)∧p) → q. But again, its application will 
involve use of an MP inference pattern.” This is as GS presupposes MP.
39 Padró (2015), fn. 56, p. 43 argues: “Suppose we try to get Harry to adopt the following more complex 
principle: ‘if there doesn’t exist something for which a predicate F does not hold, then F holds for any 
particular instance.’ … It is clear that any other principle or rule we might suggest to Harry will have to 
be general and so their application will presuppose UI.”.
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UI and MP needn’t be stated in any particular way, they just need to be logical rules 
that govern universal and conditional structures.
3.3  Adjunction and the law of non‑contradiction
Kripke and Padró claimed that adjunction (AD) and the law of non-contradiction 
(LNC) were also potential candidates for being unadoptable, and Boghossian took 
LNC to be basic and followed blindly. As we will see, Priest also takes there to be 
something special about AD. We will look at LNC first, and then at AD. (Note that 
analyzing LNC in terms of my GS is a bit more complicated, as LNC is not strictly a 
rule of inference.) Anyway, this is Padró’s argument for LNC’s unadoptability:
If we try to get someone who doesn’t reason in accordance with it to adopt it, 
the problem is that the subject could hold the law of non-contradiction itself to 
be both true and false.40
But this strikes me not as unadoptable in the way that we have been describing, 
but more like a paradox, that in taking LNC to be true and false it ends up only being 
false. One simply could not accept LNC and its negation, for to do so would be self-
defeating if LNC is true. But this has nothing to do with adoptability or basicness. 
Here, the problem with LNC does not derive from the ‘in virtue of’ relation, as one 
could keep their practice of inferring in accordance with LNC in virtue of accept-
ing it, even when they also accepted its negation. One could demonstrate accept-
ance of LNC by inferring according to reductio ad absurdum (RAA), where one can 
reject an assumption in light of a derived contradiction (to show a rejection of the 
contradiction, and thus an acceptance of LNC). But RAA seems to be adoptable, 
since GS is not of the form of a reductio, and one needn’t already have experience 
of denying assumptions in light of contradictions in order to practice RAA, nor is 
RAA needed at the meta-level. As long as some of our practice includes rejecting 
contradictions due to taking LNC as true, LNC is adoptable. LNC may have spe-
cial traits, but being unadoptable and basic is a specific trait that I classify as being 
self-governing, which LNC does not exhibit. Therefore LNC is not a required rule 
for adequate logical systems, thus it need not feature at the meta-level and logical 
pluralism is not limited by it.
Now let us turn to the rule AD. Priest claims that AD is always valid:
I think it just false that all principles of inference fail in some situation. For 
example, any situation in which a conjunction holds, the conjuncts hold, sim-
ply in virtue of the meaning of ∧.41
So, does this show us something special about AD regarding its basicness, una-
doptability and required inclusion at a meta-level of adequate logical systems? 
Let us look to its structure for answers. The structure X that AD governs is of two 
40 Padró (2015), fn. 52, p. 37.
41 Priest (2006), pp. 202–203.
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separate conjuncts coming together as one, introducing the logical component ‘and’ 
to conjoin them. Not all logical rules contain separate conjuncts (as they do not all 
contain multiple premises), and so GS is not itself of the structure of a conjunction 
(as conjunction is not part of the general structure of all of the logical rules). So, AD 
will not be self-governing in virtue of GS being of the structure X that AD governs. 
However, one may argue that AD is self-governing because structure X is described 
using the logical component that X governs. If the AD rule were stated as ‘If ‘P’ and 
‘Q’ then infer ‘P&Q’’, then the antecedent explicitly refers to the logical component, 
‘and’, that AD governs. As Padró describes:
If we accept that ‘P’ is true and accept that ‘Q’ is true, then adjunction is 
needed to conclude that one has accepted that ‘P is true and Q is true’.42
This means that whenever there is more than one premise to an argument, in 
order to conjoin them as a singularity one will need to list them as a plurality to 
take each as true. But this method presupposes AD as it requires us to be able to 
individuate multiple premises, thus all multi-premise inferences would presuppose 
an inference according to, AD. Importantly, MP is a multi-premise inference pat-
tern, since one uses it to infer from a situation of P and P → Q to a conclusion Q. Yet 
we have argued that MP is unadoptable due to being presupposed by GS. So if GS 
presupposes MP and MP presupposes AD, then GS presupposes AD. Furthermore, 
AD itself is a multi-premise inference pattern, and so AD presupposes itself, thus it 
seems to have the self-governing feature that prevents it from being adoptable.
Yet I do not agree with Padró that AD is unadoptable. This is because, on my 
analysis, what generates unadoptability is the general structure of logical rules 
(GS) being itself of the structure that the rule governs (structure X), and since GS 
is not itself a conjunction then AD need not be a conjunction itself. On a classi-
cal framework, all multi-premise rules can be reformulated as a single-premise 
rule, conjoining the premises with something that is logically equivalent to P&Q, 
such as ~ (~Pv~Q). Therefore, AD can be rewritten with one premise, moving 
from ~ (~Pv~Q) to the conclusion P&Q (rather than from two premises, P, and Q). 
This shows that it is not necessary for any logical rule to presuppose AD, as adjunc-
tion is not required when all inferences can be understood using a single premise by 
conjoining multiple premises with logically equivalent terms. MP, AD, and all other 
multi-premise rules need not presuppose AD since they can bypass the need for 
adjunction by rewriting into a singular premise, which at least on a classical frame-
work is done via interdefinability. This emphasizes the importance of GS, since it is 
this that cannot be avoided. We can rewrite rules in ways that avoid explicit refer-
ence to the components they govern, but we cannot avoid that they are rules, and 
so we cannot avoid that they are universal and conditional in structure due to being 
general and having a detached conclusion, as shown by GS. But since logical rules 
are not always of the structure of adjunction, on my analysis AD is not self-govern-
ing in the required way to be unadoptable or needed at the meta-level.43
42 Padró (2015), fn. 52, p. 37. Seemingly a grasp of meta-logical conjunction is required.
43 This assumes a way of identifying rules that may be contentious (but no room to discuss).
1 3
Synthese 
3.4  Justification and basicness
The self-governing nature of MP and UI is not only problematic for adoption of 
those rules, but also for justification of those rules. The problem of justifying a logi-
cal rule by means of the very same rule is called ‘Rule-Circularity’ in the litera-
ture.44 The problem of Rule-Circularity is roughly that the justification of any logi-
cal rule will have to appeal to the basic logical rules, and so the justification of the 
basic logical rules will appeal to themselves. They will do this by taking one step in 
their justification that makes use of a basic logical rule. Naturally, if the basic logi-
cal rules already appeal to themselves in their formulation, then they will appeal to 
themselves for justification, just as they do in application. This circularity, which I 
take to be caused by self-governance, is particularly clear in the case of MP when 
attempting to justify it syntactically, as Boghossian describes:
It is tempting to suppose that we can give an a priori justification for MP on 
the basis of our knowledge of the truth-table for ‘if, then’. Suppose that p is 
true and that ‘if p, then q’ is also true. By the truth-table for ‘if, then’, if p is 
true and if ‘if p, then q’ is true, then q is true. So q must be true, too. As is 
clear, however, this justification for MP must itself take at least one step in 
accord with MP.45
The AP therefore seems to be just another manifestation of this Rule-Circularity 
problem, both problems being caused by the self-governance of some logical rules. 
Yet what the AP shows us is that Rule-Circularity arises at a more fundamental level 
than justification, and what my analysis shows us is that at each level this is due 
to self-governance. So not only can we not justify MP and UI unless by means of 
themselves but we also cannot utilize them, due to their self-governing nature.
So far then I have argued that for a logical rule to be unadoptable is for it to be 
self-governing due to the general structure of logical rules presupposing the rule in 
question. I have shown the connection between the AP and Rule-Circularity, in that 
self-governance causes not only problems for the utility but also the justification of 
logical rules of inference. But since the AP and Rule-Circularity are put forward 
as affecting only the basic rules, I now suggest that my analysis provides an under-
standing of what basicness is, what causes it, and what it causes.
UI and MP are self-governing in that all logical rules are of conditional and uni-
versal structure, such that they unavoidably presuppose an understanding of UI and 
MP. Therefore, all logical rules require one to already know how and when to apply 
UI and MP, and this is what makes UI and MP basic, since all other logical rules 
presuppose them. Many describe ‘basic’ as meaning ‘underived’. If all other rules 
‘derive’ from the basic rules, then any problem with the basic rules impacts on the 
other rules. This is due to the basic rules being essential for what a logical rule is, so 
that if a novice cannot grasp basic rules then they cannot grasp logical rules at all. It 
thus seems the non-basic rules are not derived from UI and MP, but rather they are 
44 See Boghossian (2000) on rule-circularity; Dummett (1975) on justifying deduction.
45 Boghossian (2000), p. 231.
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governed by UI and MP. This is in line with a passing comment from Kripke about 
basicness that captures my analysis of the AP, as Padró notes:
Maybe this is what Kripke has in mind when he says that sometimes the more 
basic principles are ‘built into’ the other ones in a disguised way.46
I develop Kripke’s passing comment by arguing that UI and MP are built into the 
other rules due to self-governance, in virtue of the general structure of all logical 
rules being both universal and conditional. Logical rules seem to presuppose that 
we can make sense of instructions of the form ‘if…then’, and recognise instances as 
instances of general forms. Therefore a grasp of UI and MP is central to the notion 
of a logical rule of inference, and that is what makes them basic, unadoptable, and 
required at the meta-level for any adequate logical system. Without UI and MP, 
there is no way to make sense of, or apply, any other logical rules, since all of the 
logical rules depend on UI and MP to govern them. If we do not have UI and MP 
at the meta-level, then we will not have the instruction or guidance to move from a 
universal rule to a particular instance of structure X, nor to derive conclusion Y if 
in an instance of structure X. This is why UI and MP are basic! Without them in the 
meta-logic, the logical systems and their rules are useless, and thus, inadequate.
4  Implications for logical pluralism
Logical pluralism, in particular from the Carnapian tradition, requires there to be 
multiple true logical systems that are equally worthy of being chosen. What I have 
argued is that the worthy systems are limited to those that abide by a meta-logic 
which contains analogues of UI and MP, otherwise the system is inadequate. This 
is because whatever rules you have at the level of logical systems, for any logical 
system, one will require UI and MP at the meta-level to govern those rules. A meta-
logic without UI and MP will itself be inadequate to play the role that meta-logics 
are required to play for logical systems. As such, adequate logical systems are lim-
ited to those with adequate meta-logics, where the meta-logics must include UI and 
MP. Thus logical pluralism is limited, as I provide an extra constraint on the logical 
systems that are worthy of being chosen via constraining the meta-logic. The appeal 
to logical systems to motivate pluralism is, Kripke says, ‘misleading’:
What has given people the very misleading impression that there can be alter-
native logics in the same way there are alternative geometries is the existence 
of alternative formal systems. You see, one might think, ‘Look, logic’s got to 
be different from geometry, because we need to use logic to draw conclusions 
from any hypothesis whatsoever.’ Well, now, this is supposed to have been 
answered with the notion of a formal system. Formal systems can be followed 
blindly; a machine can check the proof; you don’t have to do anything at all; 
etcetera, etcetera… Nothing is more erroneous. Of course, a machine can be 
46 Padró (2015), p. 43: “he mentions this in passing and doesn’t want to get into the issue.”.
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programmed to check the proof. … But anyway, we are not machines in the 
sense of not using reasoning to understand what we are told, what formal sys-
tem this is. We are given a set of directions, that is, any statement of the fol-
lowing form is an axiom: if these premises are accepted any conclusion of this 
form must be accepted. These directions themselves use logical particles, as 
Quine has rightly pointed out. Because of this use of logical particles, under-
standing what follows in a certain formal system itself presupposes a certain 
understanding of logic in advance, and cannot be done blindly.47
What this suggests, as I have argued and demonstrated, is that appealing to the 
alternative logical systems that logical pluralism permits does not escape a cer-
tain monism at the meta-level of logic. UI and MP are presupposed in understand-
ing what those formal systems entail and how the rules from those systems can be 
understood. Without UI and MP, we cannot derive anything from our plurality of 
logical systems, or even comprehend the rules of inference at play in those systems. 
We cannot use the existence of multiple alternative logical systems and their practi-
cal usage in various domains to prove the truth of logical pluralism, since beneath 
those systems there is a fundamental meta-logic that is required to make sense of 
them. This is further supported by the following quote from Kripke:
There is no bedrock in the notion of a formal system which we can choose 
somehow to adopt or reject at will and then tailor one’s logic to it. One has to 
first use reasoning in order to even see what is provable in a formal system. 
Formal systems don’t say anything as they are; they are just formal objects… 
If one then gives them an interpretation, one can check, using the reasoning 
that we always did (and what other reasoning do we have? None, as I’m trying 
to say) whether under this interpretation they are (a) sound and (b) complete.48
It is this sort of argument that is often cited to motivate the dis-analogy between 
logic and geometry. Geometry (like formal logical systems) depends upon a certain 
logic in order to derive anything from it. But there is no place else to go when deriv-
ing things from logic itself, and it cannot be done independently of itself.49 Logic is 
needed to reason about anything, including formal logical systems and geometry.50 
In logic we say that a meta-logic is required (whereas for geometry no meta-geom-
etry is required), and what I have argued is that this meta-logic must include UI 
and MP given their importance in underwriting the nature of what logical rules of 
47 Kripke [quote found in Padró (2015), p. 82].
48 Kripke [Pittsburgh Lecture, quote found in Padró (2015), p. 14].
49 This point is also motivated by Kripke: “Logic, even if one tried to throw intuition to the wind, cannot 
be like geometry, because one cannot adopt the logical laws as hypothesis and draw their consequences. 
You need logic in order to draw these consequences. There can be no neutral ground in which to discuss 
the drawing of consequences independently of logic itself. If there were it would be some special kind, 
called ‘ur-logic,’ and that would be what was really logic.” Kripke [Pittsburgh Lecture, quote found in 
Padró (2015), p. 140].
50 For further support of this claim, see Field (1996), p. 369, for example.
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inference are, what they do, and how they work. Even those who defend the analogy 
between logic and geometry, like Priest, appreciate this idea:
The articulation of a logical system requires the employment of a metalogic 
(normally an informal one, and not necessarily classical), whereas the articula-
tion of a geometric system does not require the employment of a metageom-
etry.51
I conclude that logical pluralism is limited due to the required employment of UI 
and MP in the meta-logic, which itself is due to the self-governing nature of UI and 
MP. I develop, rather than repeat, ideas from the AP and Kripke, by restricting the 
AP to UI and MP, diagnosing self-governance, formulating GS, defining basicness, 
and most importantly in this paper, explicitly relating to limiting logical pluralism.
5  Conclusion
The morals that one can draw from this paper are: Logical novices cannot adopt 
basic logical rules. Why? Because they are not able to utilize such rules, in that they 
are not able to infer in accordance with them in virtue of accepting them. Why? 
Because such inference presupposes the very same rule they are accepting. Why? 
Because basic logical rules are self-governing as they are of the structure of the logi-
cal component that they themselves govern. What does this mean for logical plural-
ism? It shows logical pluralism is limited, given that these basic logical rules under-
write all the other rules, meaning they will be required at the meta-level for any 
adequate logical system. This leaves us with a kind of monism (or at least another 
restricted pluralism52) at the meta-level, given that we cannot escape the meta-logic 
that we use to reason about (and derive things from) logical systems. Furthermore, 
the content of that required meta-logic must include UI and MP, as the reason why 
UI and MP are unadoptable is the same reason why they are basic and presupposed 
at the meta-level—namely, self-governance.
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